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the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 14 joined the ranks of the minority of jurisdictions permitting the firm to assert the privilege against its former client. 15 At first blush, a non-lawyer might be outraged at the notion of allowing a law firm to shield documents generated during its representation of an outside client from that client. It may appear that the firm's ethical duty of loyalty to a current client should trump the firm's evidentiary privilege. However, the thesis of this Article is that the Georgia and Massachusetts courts came to the right result.
Part II of this Article is descriptive, surveying the current split of authority. 16 In contrast, Part III and Part IV of the Article are evaluative. 17 Part III addresses the merits of the threshold policy question of whether a law firm should ever be permitted to invoke the attorney-client privilege to shield in-house consultations about a client's potential malpractice claim from the outside client. 18 Part III argues that the courts subscribing to the majority view have misconstrued the case law on the so-called fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege. 19 Part III concludes that at least in some circumstances, a firm has the right to invoke the privilege against its former client. 20 Next, Part IV attempts to define the circumstances in which courts should uphold an intra-firm privilege against a former client. 21 In particular, Part IV analyzes the thorny question of whether the privilege attaches to the firm's in-house consultations even when the firm engages in such consultations without the outside client's consent. 22 Part IV contends that the courts requiring the outside client's consent have misconceived an evidence issue as an ethics question. 23 This Article does not purport to offer a definitive resolution of these issues. Given the paucity of authority on point and the most recent decisions from Georgia and Massachusetts, it would be presumptuous to 14 St. Simons Waterfront, LLC, 746 S.E.2d at 102; RFF Family P'ship, LP, 991 N.E.2d at 1067-68. 15 See RFF Family P'ship, LP, 991 N.E.2d at 1078-79 (citing other jurisdictions' decisions on the issue and explaining its opposing conclusion); Robert L. Byman, So, You've Screwed Up. Now What? NAT'L L.J., (Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=12 02637723731/So-Youve-Screwed-Up-Now-What%3Fmcode=0&curindex=0&curpage=ALL (discussing the Georgia and Massachusetts decisions).
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claim to be able to do so. However, the prevalence of legal malpractice claims makes these issues critical to both the bar and its clientele. The intent of this Article is to promote a deeper, more robust debate between the proponents of the traditional majority and emerging minority views.
II. A DESCRIPTION OF THE PRESENT SPLIT OF AUTHORITY OVER THE QUESTION OF THE FIRM'S RIGHT TO ASSERT THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE FOR ITS IN-HOUSE CONSULTATIONS ABOUT A POTENTIAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM BY A THEN CURRENT CLIENT
As Part I noted, there is presently a split of authority over the issue of a firm's ability to invoke the attorney-client privilege to shield inhouse consultations about a possible malpractice action by a then current client. First, Part II.A discusses the traditional view denying the firm the right to assert the privilege. 24 Second, Part II.B explains the minority view giving the firm the right to assert the privilege. 25 
A. The Traditional, Majority View Denying the Firm the Right to Assert the Privilege Against Its Former Outside Client
The majority view is that the firm cannot assert the attorney-client privilege against its former client. 26 For decades, "[a] nearly unbroken line of cases" adopted this view. 27 Some of these cases went to the length of announcing that the firm could not invoke the privilege against the former client "under any circumstances." 28 First, this section discusses state authority in this regard. 29 It then goes on to explain the federal authority supporting this view. 30 
State Authority
There is both state and federal support for the majority view. A depublished California decision, McCormick v. Superior Court, 31 illustrates many courts' reluctance to allow a privilege to attach to a firm's in-house 24 See infra Part II.A. 25 See infra Part II.B. Habte, supra note 7, at 1761. 
Imwinkelried: Preliminary Thoughts on an Attorney-Client Privilege for Law Firm
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015 720 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48 consultations against a then current client. 32 In McCormick, the client, Nelson, made noises suggesting that he might sue the firm. 33 At that juncture, the firm hired and consulted with outside counsel about the potential claim. 34 In addition, the firm members working on Nelson's case consulted with Whitney, a member of the firm's own management committee. 35 Nelson subsequently sued the firm. 36 During pretrial discovery, Nelson demanded production of a number of the firm's documents. 37 The requested documents included writings reflecting consultations between the firm members representing Nelson and Whitney. 38 The firm cited the attorney-client privilege as the basis for its refusal to produce. 39 To support its objection, the firm submitted Whitney's declaration to the effect that Whitney and the consulting firm members created the documents "for the ultimate use of [the firm] in representing its own interests and other counsel ultimately retained by [the firm] in the event that [the client] did file a lawsuit." 40 The intermediate appellate court in California rejected the firm's argument. 41 The court professed that it could not understand how the firm could simultaneously be both the attorney for Nelson and a client with a privilege against Nelson: "If the McCormick firm was the client, who was its lawyer? And who was the client communicating with?" 42 The court characterized the firm's position as a contention that "its internally generated documents [were] . . . privileged 'communications' with its lawyer, i.e., with itself." 43 Instead, the court concluded that the communications between Whitney and the firm members working on Nelson's case did not qualify as "confidential communications between a client and a client's lawyer." 44 It is true that in some passages, the court seemed to stop short of adopting a sweeping holding that a firm could never invoke a privilege against a litigant who was a firm client at the time of the Id. at 110. 34 Id.
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communications. 45 However, in other passages the court employed broad language implying that the court would never entertain an attorney-client privilege claim for intra-firm communications about a potential malpractice claim by a then current client. 46 
Federal Authority
There are also several federal opinions lending support to the majority view. 47 One of the most cited federal opinions is the 1989 decision by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in In re Sunrise Security Litigation. 48 Sunrise was the seminal decision applying the so-called "fiduciary duty exception" to the privilege in this context. 49 In Sunrise, a law firm had represented a failed savings and loan association (Sunrise). 50 The firm was joined as a defendant with the association in an action by both the association's former shareholders and the government. 51 When the plaintiffs sought production of some of the firm's internal work documents concerning the firm's representation of the association, the firm objected on privilege grounds. 52 Unlike the McCormick court, the court was willing to accept the generalization that "'a law firm may consult its own attorneys as house counsel to secure legal advice in connection with or related to the firm's representation of a client, and as a result obtain the protection of the attorney client privilege on the basis that it is its own client.'" 53 The court stated that it was "not willing to hold that a law firm may never make privileged communications with [its own] in house counsel." 54 However, the court then carved out an important exception to the generalization-citing the state rule modeled after A.B.A. Model Rule of Professional Responsibility 1.7 on a lawyer's duty of loyalty, the court asserted that applying the privilege to the firm's in-house consultations 45 See id. at 111 (noting the court's remark that the firm had not taken any clear, definitive steps to sufficiently differentiate normal intra-firm communications from the communications between Whitney and the firm members representing Nelson). could conflict with the firm's fiduciary duty to the then current client. 55 The court stated that given the firm's ethical duties, the privilege would not attach to "communications or legal advice in which [the firm's] representation of itself violated Rule 1.7." 56 In the court's mind, if the firm's in-house consultation created a conflict of interest between the firm's interests and those of the outside client, the privilege must yield. As in the case of the McCormick decision, the Sunrise opinion mentioned facts suggesting a more limited holding. 57 However, the Sunrise court's assertion of the fiduciary exception was so forceful that the exception seemed expansive enough to virtually swallow up the generalization.
After 63 In the suit, CL sought production of the documents reflecting the firm's internal review. 64 As in McCormick and Sunrise, the firm cited the attorney-client privilege as a ground for objecting to the production request. 65 The court overruled the objection. 66 The court relied on Sunrise as precedent. 67 The court reasoned that since CL "was still its client" at the time of the internal review, the firm was "in no position to claim a privilege against their client. While the privilege will be applicable against all the world, it cannot be maintained against" CL. 68 The court 55 Id. at 595 & n.8. 56 Id. at 597; see Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1735-36 (quoting the court and providing a summary of the court's reasoning).
57
See Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1750 ("In In re Sunrise . . . firm in-house counsel had an obvious conflict of interest under Rule 1.7 because the lawyers who acted as so-called firm counsel were mostly the same lawyers who represented the outside client."). 58 Id. at 1736. Id. at 284. 61 Id.
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underscored the firm's fiduciary duty of loyalty to its outside client at the time of the in-house consultation. 69 The court asserted flatly that "a law firm cannot invoke the attorney-client privilege against a current client when performing a conflict check in furtherance of representing that client." 70 Once again, some commentators have argued that the Bank Brussels ruling could be limited to the peculiar facts of the case. 71 However, on its face the opinion reads as a ringing endorsement of the fiduciary duty exception announced in Sunrise. 72 The second noteworthy 2002 decision was Koen Book Distributors v. Powell, Trachtman, Logan, Carrle, Bowman & Lombardo, P.C. 73 The plaintiff book company had hired the defendant firm for advice pertaining to a security interest from one of the company's customers, Crown Books Corporation. 74 When Crown Books filed for bankruptcy, the firm represented Koen in the bankruptcy proceedings. 75 However, Koen became dissatisfied with the quality of the firm's services and informed the firm that it was considering filing a malpractice action. 76 Ultimately, Koen terminated the firm's services in mid-August 2001. 77 However, in the interim the firm's lawyers representing Koen consulted another firm member about the "ethical and legal issues that had arisen out of the 69 Id.
70
71
E.g., Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1750-51. Professor Chambliss has proposed two different bases for a narrow reading of the holding. One is that the firm member who headed the Clients and Ethics Committee "was not formally designated or compensated as in-house counsel." Id. at 1750. The second is that the facts suggest that one of the purposes of the consultation was the unethical objective of concealing the conflict from the client. Id. at 1751. If that had been the firm's objective, the crime/fraud exception to the attorneyclient privilege might come into play. Id. See generally 2 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 6.13.2.d, at 1166-99 (2d ed. 2010) (providing an in-depth overview of the crime-fraud exception).
72
Given the nature of the fact situation, the reader might wonder why the court did not uphold the privilege on the ground that the party seeking discovery was a non-party. As Part I pointed out, as a general proposition even the courts rejecting the assertion of the privilege against the client at the time of the communication ordinarily sustain privilege claims against third parties. See Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1732-33 (explaining the scope of the privilege regarding non-clients). However, as previously stated, one of the plaintiffs in the instant case was a group of shareholders. The courts sometimes treat shareholders as representatives of the corporate entity. Id. at 1733-34 (citing Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970)). Thus, since the defendant had represented the corporate entity, the court might have conceived the case as a dispute between representatives of the client (the shareholders) and the client's attorney (the law firm). Id. at 284. 75 Id.
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Imwinkelried: Preliminary Thoughts on an Attorney-Client Privilege for Law Firm 78 Those consultations generated a number of internal firm documents. 79 Koen later sued the firm for malpractice. 80 During discovery, Koen demanded that the firm produce those documents. 81 The firm resisted, citing the attorney-client privilege as the justification for its refusal. 82 Like the other 2002 decision, Bank Brussels, the Koen court turned to Sunrise as authority. 83 The court declared:
[A] law firm owes a fiduciary duty to a client and may not engage in conflicting representations absent the exceptions set forth in Rule 1.7 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct. Otherwise, to the extent that the seeking or obtaining of legal advice by one lawyer from another lawyer inside the firm "implicates or creates a conflict of interest," the attorney-client privilege between the lawyers is vitiated. 84 According to the court, the conflict negates the privilege. 85 The court found that the firm was "engaged in a conflict of interest . . . when it was receiving information from and/or providing legal advice to several of its lawyers while at the same time continuing to represent" Koen. 86 Weighing the competing interests of the client and firm, the court decided that the firm's fiduciary duty to its client was "paramount." 87 The court acknowledged that its ruling placed the firm "in an unenviable situation." 88 However, the court reasoned that if the firm neither withdrew from representing the outside client nor obtained the client's consent to the in-house consultations about the client's potential claim, the firm had to "forego the benefit of the attorney-client privilege . . . during this period." 89 78 Id.
79
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Id. 90 There the court affirmed the majority Sunrise view with a rhetorical flourish:
[W]hen a law firm chooses to represent itself, it runs the risk that the representation may create an impermissible conflict of interest with one of more of its current clients. In light of these ethical concerns, the courts that have considered the issue have resoundingly found that, where conflicting duties exist, the law firm's right to claim privilege must give way to the interest in protecting current clients who may be harmed by the conflict . . . . As a result, a law firm cannot assert the attorney-client privilege against a current outside client when the communications that it seeks to protect arise out of self-representation that creates an impermissible conflicting relationship with that outside client. 91 
B. The Growing Minority View
Although the Sonic Blue court declared in 2008 that "the courts that have considered the issue have resoundingly" affirmed the majority view, 92 even at that time the assertion was an overstatement. There was contrary federal authority then, 93 98 A grand jury later undertook an investigation into the misconduct and subpoenaed the associates. 99 In response, the associates asserted the firm's attorney-client privilege. 100 The district court rejected the associates' claim. 101 The judge expressed unease about her ruling. 102 Nevertheless, she ordered the associates to testify:
According to the judge, who had spoken to the associates in camera, "Basically, they were trusted young associates [who] were asked to do some leg work and come up with information . . . .
[T]hey were . . . helping out."
The judge noted that the associates were never told they were working as the firm's attorneys; that they didn't bill the firm or record hours expended on the firm's behalf; and that, because they were far less experienced than Rowe, "[t]hey were certainly taking direction from him." 103 Rowe and the firm appealed from the district court order. 104 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed. 105 At the outset of his analysis, Judge Kozinski rejected two distinctions proposed by the United States. 106 First, the court held that a firm may invoke the attorney-client privilege whether it consults in-house or an outside firm. 107 associates could qualify as counsel for the firm as a client. 111 The court conceded that the retention of outside counsel might make it easier for a firm to show that it anticipated litigation; but on the facts in Rowe, "it [was] clear that litigation was anticipated." 112 Thus, there was a sufficient inference that the firm had initially sought counsel, that is, the associates, for legal advice. 113 Further, since Rowe had asked the associates to "'sift[] through the facts with an eye to the legally relevant,'" the associates were acting in their capacity as attorneys for the firm during their subsequent investigation. 114 The Ninth Circuit remanded to the district court for further factual findings rather than finally upholding the privilege claim. 115 However, the court made it clear that at least in certain circumstances, a firm may assert the privilege to protect intra-firm communications about the potential malpractice claim of a person who was an outside client of the firm at the very time of the communications. 116 While the Rowe decision antedated Sonic Blue, three years after Sonic Blue another federal court departed from the majority view. In 2011, a federal District Court in Ohio handed down its decision in TattleTale Alarm Systems, Inc. v. Calfee, Halter & Griswold, LLP. 117 The court argued that the majority view has undesirable consequences. 118 According to the court, the majority view creates a significant disincentive for firm members to consult with more experienced in-house counsel about "rectif[ying] [an error] before the client is irreparably damaged. If such lawyers believe that these communications will eventually be revealed to the client in the context of a legal malpractice case, they will be much less likely to seek prompt advice from members of the same firm." 119 In the court's view, in many if not most cases, immediate consultation with experienced in-house counsel is likely to benefit the outside client. 120 Especially when the firm has designated in-house counsel for these 111 Id.
112
Id. at 1296. 113 Id. at 1297 ("[H]e asked lawyers-not secretaries, paralegals, librarians or other of the firm's employees-to conduct the investigation . . . [thus] he is justified in expecting that communications with these lawyers will be privileged."). Id. at 1297-98. 116 Gillers, supra note 32, at 109; see Sadler, supra note 10, at 861-64 (discussing the Rowe opinion). 
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See infra text accompanying note 119 (presenting the court's argument). 
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Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015 purposes, the firm's lawyers "should be encouraged to seek advice promptly." 121 The veteran in-house counsel's advice may enable the firm members representing the outside client to moot the malpractice issue by devising a better strategy to prevail for the client in the litigation or transaction. The court implicitly criticized the Bank Brussels opinion, stating that if the firm had to withdraw and seek its own outside counsel, it may be too late to protect the [outside] client from damage. 122 The upshot is that as of 2011, there was a sharp split of authority over this issue among the federal courts. 124 RFF hired the firm to investigate the property to ensure that RFF could foreclose on the property if the borrower defaulted. 125 When the borrower defaulted, RFF sued to foreclose; but, its foreclosure action was enjoined when the assignee of another mortgage on the same property claimed that its mortgage was superior to RFF's. 126 While the firm was still representing RFF and seeking to obtain judicial authorization of the foreclosure, RFF hired another law firm, Prince Lobel Tye LLP. 127 Prince sent the firm a notice that RFF considered the firm guilty of malpractice on the ground that the firm had failed to discover the existing, prior mortgage. 128 At that point, the firm's attorneys representing RFF consulted with Rosenblatt, a firm partner who had been designated to respond to ethical and risk management issues. 129 RFF later sued the firm for malpractice. 130 121 Id. It is true that, in Rowe, the in-house counsel were relatively inexperienced associates. See supra text accompanying note 97 (characterizing the in-house counsel as young associates). However, firms' liability insurers are now pressuring them to appoint experienced counsel to advise junior firm members on matters of legal ethics and risk management, including malpractice claims. See Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1721-22 (explaining that using in-house counsel promotes better risk management and lowers the cost of liability insurance). Id. at 1068. 125 Id.
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When RFF noticed the deposition of the firm attorneys who had represented RFF, the firm sought a protective order. 131 The firm contended that its attorney-client privilege protected any communications between Rosenblatt and the firm attorneys representing RFF about RFF's potential malpractice claim. 132 When the trial judge entered the protective order, RFF appealed to the intermediate appellate court. 133 Since the Supreme Judicial Court believed that the case posed an important issue, by its own motion the court transferred the case to its docket. 134 On appeal, RFF essentially asked the court to adopt the position endorsed by Koen. 135 As the Supreme Judicial Court stated:
RFF argues that when an attorney in a law firm seeks legal advice from in-house counsel regarding how the attorney or the firm should respond to a claim or threatened claim of malpractice brought by a current client, these communications are not protected from disclosure to the client unless the law firm, before seeking the advice, has either withdrawn from the representation or fully disclosed to the client that the law firm and client have a conflict of interest and obtained the client's informed consent for the law firm to seek legal advice. 136 After stating RFF's argument, the court proceeded to reject the argument based on policy and precedent. As a matter of policy, the court agreed with TattleTale that the minority view encourages firm members to seek advice from more experienced firm members about potential malpractice claims and encouraging such conduct is in outside clients' interest. 137 The court drew upon the assertion in TattleTale that firm members who fear they may have harmed an outside client's interest ought to consult senior firm members who "may be better schooled in ethical rules, and will almost certainly be better capable of dispassionate analysis of the problem at hand." 138 Like the TattleTale
130
Id. at 1069. 131 Id.
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133
Id. at 1069-70. 134 Id. at 1070. 135 Id. at 1075. 136 Id. at 1070. court, the Supreme Judicial Court doubted that firm members would routinely consult senior firm counsel for this purpose if the members realized that "the consultation may not remain private." 139 The court then undertook an analysis of the precedent governing the fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege. The court stated that, in the typical situation in which a trustee uses trust funds to pay for an attorney's advice about trust management, "'the beneficiaries [are] the "real clients,"'" and the trustee therefore may not invoke the privilege to prevent the beneficiaries from discovering the contents of the communications between the trustee and the attorney. 140 The court noted that in 2011 in United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 141 the U.S. Supreme Court indicated that the trustee cannot invoke the privilege against the beneficiary "when a trustee obtained legal advice to guide the administration of the trust, and not for the trustee's own defense in litigation." 142 However, the Supreme Judicial Court distinguished the atypical case where after a credible threat of litigation between the trustee and beneficiaries has arisen, the trustee seeks legal advice to prepare a defense and pays the lawyer. 143 Although a person may have freely agreed to serve as a trustee, he or she "'is not completely debilitated'" from taking steps "'to defend'" himself or herself. 144 A person does not render himself or herself defenseless by agreeing to become a trustee. The court noted that like a trustee, a lawyer has a right to self-defense. 145 Indeed, A.B.A. Model Rule 1.6 even permits the lawyer to disclose the client's otherwise privileged communications when necessary to establish the lawyer's defense. 146 In its next breath, though, the court imposed limitations on the scope of the firm's privilege for in-house consultations. Specifically, the court prescribed "four conditions": (1) the law firm must formally or informally designate the attorney or attorneys within the firm who will "represent the firm in matters as in-house or ethics counsel;" (2) the attorney representing the firm must not have performed any work on the outside client's case or a substantially related matter; (3) time investigating the potential claim against the firm must be billed to the firm rather than the outside client; and (4) the communications between the attorneys representing the outside client and the in-house counsel must be made in confidence and kept confidential. 147 The very next day, July 11, 2013, the Georgia Supreme Court issued its opinion in St. Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C. 148 Like the RFF case, St. Simons adopts the minority view. 149 St. Simon Waterfront ("SSW") was interested in developing a commercial real estate venture. 150 SSW hired the firm to perform the legal work related to the venture, including drafting the standard form purchase contract. 151 However, after a number of prospective buyers had signed the contract, they notified SSW that they intended to rescind because of several "alleged defects in the purchase contract." 152 In a February 2008 conference call between SSW and the firm, SSW indicated that it blamed the firm for the rescissions and would seek to hold it responsible for any damages. 153 After the call, the participating firm members contacted Arnold Young, the firm's in-house general counsel. 154 While the firm continued representing SSW, the firm members representing SSW communicated with Young about SSW's potential malpractice claim. 155 In 2009, SSW sued the firm for malpractice. 156 In the pretrial discovery phase, SSW attempted to depose firm members concerning the in-house consultations about the malpractice claim and demanded the production of documents reflecting the consultations. 157 The firm objected on the basis of the attorney-client privilege and filed a privilege log supporting the objection. 158 The trial judge overruled the objection. 159 Following the majority view, the judge reasoned that the in-house consultations created a conflict of interest between the outside client's and firm's interests and 147 Id. at 1080. 
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See id. at 104 (discussing a number of authorities reaching the opposite result). 150 Id. at 102. 151 Id.
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Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015 that the conflict "negated" the privilege. 160 The firm appealed, and the case eventually reached the state supreme court. 161 After describing the procedural setting and the underlying facts, the court acknowledged that there was a split of authority on the issue; and, in its survey of the case law, the court identified three competing views. 162 The views span a wide spectrum: (1) one extreme position is that the firm cannot claim a privilege against the outside client "under any circumstances" if the attorney-client relationship with the client existed at the time of the in-house consultations; (2) other courts hold that "the privilege applies only in limited circumstances," which include such procedural safeguards as notifying the outside client of the fact of the ongoing, in-house consultations; and (3) still another view is that "the privilege does apply or that it applies with narrow exceptions." 163 Rather than formally adopting any of the competing views, the court announced that "the best course is simply to analyze the privilege issue here as we would in any other lawsuit in which the privilege is asserted." 164 Like the RFF court, the court described the steps that the firm should take to establish that the firm itself has become a client entitled to the protection of the privilege. The court indicated the following: The attorney advising the firm members representing the outside client should not participate in the underlying representation; the attorney ought to open a new file separate from the files for the outside client's case; the attorney must bill his or her time to the firm, not the outside client; and the firm should designate the attorney as firm inhouse counsel with some "level of formality." 165 The court stated that the ideal structural arrangement is one in which the designated counsel "holds a full-time position as firm counsel to the exclusion of other work." 166 The court stated that if the firm observed these practices, the firm members could be deemed representatives of the firm as a client consulting the in-house lawyer; the members would not be considered as merely "consulting with a colleague as part of their representation of [an outside] client or discussing general firm business." 167 If the firm follows that practice, the firm would then have an opportunity to make a 160 Id.
161
162
See id. at 104 (discussing several cases on the topic). 163 Id.
164
165
Id. at 105. 166 Id. showing that all the normal requirements for the privilege, such as confidentiality, have been satisfied. 168 In the second half of the opinion, the court grappled with the tension between the privilege and the firm's ethical responsibilities to the outside client. The court conceded that some courts had concluded that those ethical duties trump the firm's entitlement to the attorney-client privilege. 169 The court referred to the Koen theory that a fiduciary exception precludes the firm from asserting the privilege for communications relating to a potential malpractice claim by a then current client. 170 However, the court advanced two counter-arguments. The first was that evidentiary and ethical rules can differ. 171 In the court's words, "this opinion is not intended to resolve the ethical quandary and instead addresses only the evidentiary questions of privilege." 172 The court pointed to "our State Bar's admonition that the Rules of Professional Conduct are not intended to affect the law of privilege." 173 Assuming that there is a fiduciary exception in legal ethics, the court "decline[d] to adopt the fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege in this context." 174 The court's second counter-argument was that the firm is not guilty of any unethical conduct unless the firm endeavors to mislead the outside client about the in-house consultations. 175 In dictum, the court stated that "to the extent there is an allegation that in-house counsel has been employed by firm attorneys in an effort to defraud rather than merely defend against a client, the privilege" would be unavailable. 176 There was no such allegation in the Georgia case. 
III. A CRITICAL EVALUATION
Imwinkelried: Preliminary Thoughts on an Attorney-Client Privilege for Law Firm firm may invoke the attorney-client privilege to protect internal consultations between an in-house counsel and the firm members representing an outside client when the subject of the consultation is a potential claim by the then current client. 177 This Part addresses the threshold policy question of whether a firm should ever be able to assert the privilege against such an outside client. First, Part III.A discusses situations where an attorney's duty of confidentiality is excused to obtain legal advice about compliance with the ethical rules, or where the lawyer needs to defend himself against a claim. 178 Next, Part III.B analyzes the different ethical and policy considerations relevant to the propriety of treating a law firm as its own client when determining whether the firm enjoys a privilege. 179
A. The Case for Granting the Firm a Privilege
When an outside client threatens a malpractice suit, the law firm undeniably has substantial interests, both financial and reputational, at stake. If the former client prevails in a malpractice action, the firm could suffer an adverse judgment in the millions. 180 Even if the former client does not sue, unfavorable publicity for the potential claim can damage the firm's reputation and reduce its future ability to attract clientele.
The rules of legal ethics reflect that these are legitimate interests worthy of legal protection. 181 In particular, two provisions of A.B.A. Model Rule 1.6 reflect the bar's recognition of the legitimacy of the interests. Rule 1.6 governs the attorney's duty of confidentiality to the client. 182 Rule 1.6(a) prescribes that the attorney generally has a duty to maintain the confidentiality of information relating to the client's representation. 183 lawyer's compliance with these Rules." 185 Further, Rule 1.6(b)(5) explicitly provides that the attorney may disclose such information "to establish a . . . defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client." 186 Official Comment 11 states that Rule 1.6(b)(5) extends to fee disputes with the client when the lawyer is attempting to protect his or her financial interests. 187 These provisions implicitly recognize the magnitude of the firm's interests. In the type of dispute that is our principal focus, the question is whether the former outside client can discover the firm's own internal consultations about the malpractice claim. In contrast, Rule 1.6(b) enumerates situations in which the lawyer has the right to disclose the client's own privileged communications over the client's protest. 188 The outside client has a more intense interest in the privacy of its own communications. If the lawyer's reputational and financial interests are substantial enough to defeat the client's confidentiality expectation in its own communications, there is all the more reason to conclude that those interests warrant extending a privilege to the firm's internal communications in which the outside client did not participate at all.
Similarly situated entities enjoy a privilege to protect their comparable interests. A law firm is a business organization. 189 It is well settled that business partnerships and associations can qualify as holders of the attorney-client privilege. 190 Indeed, one of the leading cases following the majority view, Sunrise, recognized that point of law. 191 California's statutory provisions are illustrative. California Evidence Code section 951 governing the attorney-client privilege defines "client" as any "person" consulting an attorney for legal advice. 192 In turn, 185 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(4) (2011).
186
Id. at R. 1.6(b)(5). 187 Id. at R. 1.6(b)(5) cmt. 11. 188 Id. at R. 1.6(b). 189 Sadler, supra note 10, at 867.
190
See 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 9, § 6.5.1, at 557-58 (discussing the attorney-client privilege available to entities such as associations, corporations, and government agencies); Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1728-29 (discussing cases recognizing a privilege for in-house counsel); Gillers, supra note 32, at 107 ("It is settled law that the attorney client privilege protects communications between corporate directors, officers or employees and in-house corporate counsel."); Sadler, supra note 10, at 866 (recognizing that the A.B.A. treats partnerships, corporations, and other legal entities the same under Rule 1.13); see also 193 Given the breadth of this rule and the substantiality of the firm's legitimate interests, the RFF court found "'no principled reason'" for denying a privilege to the firm for its internal consultations about potential malpractice claims. 194 
B. The Case Against Granting a Privilege
That, of course, is the key policy issue: Is there a principled distinction between a law firm and a non-legal partnership that does enjoy a privilege? The proponents of the traditional, majority view have urged two bases for recognizing a distinction. The first basis for recognizing a distinction that opponents of the privilege rely on is the conceptual objection of treating a law firm as its own client. 195 The second basis relied on is the ethical objection of treating a law firm as its own client. 196
The Conceptual Objection to Treating a Law Firm as Its Own Client
Several courts following the majority view have professed that they cannot understand how a law firm can at once be the attorney for the outside client as well as its own client. As we saw in Part II.A, the McCormick court asked rhetorically: "If the McCormick firm was the client, who was its lawyer?" 197 The Sunrise court voiced the same doubt when it questioned how the firm as lawyer and the firm as client could be represented by attorneys who are members of "one and the same entity." 198 However, this conceptual argument does not establish the logical impossibility of treating some firm members as client (the attorneys representing the outside client) at the same time that another firm member (the in-house counsel) serves as attorney. In rejecting the argument, the Rowe court analogized to the law governing the privilege between corporations and their in-house counsel. 199 
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European countries do not recognize a legal privilege between a corporate entity and its in-house counsel. 200 However, in the United States the law is to the contrary. 201 Under domestic American law, a corporate client can have an attorney-client relationship with one of its own employees, that is, its paid in-house counsel. 202 In 1915, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that an in-house counsel can qualify as the attorney for the purposes of creating an attorney-client relationship with his or her corporate employer. 203 "At the present time, all jurisdictions within the United States, both state and federal, recognize the attorney-client privilege for in-house counsel." 204 In the situation described in the preceding paragraph, the corporate entity constitutes the client while an employee of the entity, the in-house counsel, functions as attorney. One natural person employee, the inhouse counsel, provides legal services to other natural person corporate employees, who personify the entity client. Similarly, although a law firm usually serves as attorney for outside clients, the firm can don the hat of client and enter into a privileged attorney-client relationship with one of its own members, the designated firm counsel. Here too one natural person member, the designated counsel, furnishes legal advice to other natural person members, the firm attorneys representing the outside client. The existence of the artificial entity should not obscure the human reality that different natural persons are performing the attorney and client roles. In a very real sense, there is a division of labor. Hence, logic does not dictate denying a law firm a privilege for its internal consultations between in-house counsel and the firm members representing an outside client. If the privilege is to be denied, it must be done on more substantial policy grounds.
The Ethical Objection to Treating a Law Firm as Its Own Client
The second basis relied on by opponents of treating law firms as their own client and granting them privilege is ethical. The proponent's arguments and critiques of their arguments will be discussed in the following paragraphs. 205 200 See 2 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 71, §12.2, at 1658 n.1 (discussing the approach to inhouse counsel and attorney-client privilege used by several European countries).
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The proponents of the majority view contend that there are such grounds, based on legal ethics. They advance a formal argument as well as a more fundamental argument based on the policies inspiring legal ethical rules.
The formal argument is that treating the firm as its own client violates the A.B.A. Model Rules of Professional Conduct by creating an unethical conflict of interest for the in-house counsel advising the firm members representing the outside client. A.B.A. Model Rule 1.7(a)(1) declares that an attorney may not "concurrent[ly]" represent two clients when "the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client." 206 Model Rule 1.10 announces a general rule that when one firm member is disqualified from representing a client, the other members of the same firm are vicariously disqualified from doing so. 207 The proponents of the majority view point to those two rules and argue along these lines: The firm members representing the outside client certainly cannot directly oppose the client's interests-as the outside client's counsel, they are personally disqualified from doing so; ordinarily, a personal conflict of one firm member is automatically imputed to other firm members; if the personal conflict of the members representing the outside client is vicariously imputed to the firm's inhouse counsel, that counsel must be deemed to be simultaneously representing and opposing the outside client; and the latter, in-house firm counsel therefore has a disqualifying, actual conflict of interest. 208 The Bank Brussels court encapsulated this line of argument when it asserted that "a conflict as to one attorney at a firm [the member representing the outside client] is a conflict as to all [including the inhouse counsel purporting to represent the firm itself]. 
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At a more fundamental level, the proponents of the traditional view contend that the conflict rules are intended to enforce the firm's duty of loyalty to the outside client. Koen is an eloquent statement of the contention. After discussing the formal conflict rules set out in Pennsylvania's version of Model Rule 1.7, the court cites Sunrise and rests its decision squarely on the lawyer's fiduciary duties to the client. 210 Faced with a policy choice between enforcing those duties and protecting the firm's interests, the court stated that those fiduciary duties are "paramount." 211
b. The Critique of the Proponents' Arguments
Although the proponents' arguments seem plausible, there are persuasive responses to the proponent's formal argument as well as their policy argument. Professor Chambliss has presented a critique of the formal argument. 212 In its 2013 decision, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court endorsed Professor Chambliss's criticism of the traditionalists' construction of the Model Rules. 213 Her analysis convinced the court that in the typical case, it does not significantly serve either the firm's duty of loyalty or the outside client's confidentiality interests to "apply[] the [formal] rule of [vicarious] imputation to the representation of a law firm by its in-house counsel." 214 She begins her critique by noting that the commentary and judicial gloss on the conflict rules demonstrate that those rules are intended primarily as means of enforcing the attorney's duties of confidentiality and loyalty to the client. 215 She explains that neither ethical duty requires the vicarious imputation of the conflict of the firm members representing the outside client to the firm's in-house counsel. 216 Her analysis of the confidentiality rationale for the conflict rules is trenchant. As she observes, the foremost rationale for the confidentiality duty is to prevent the attorney from disclosing the client's confidential information to third parties. 217 In her mind, it makes little sense to treat confidentiality as a rationale for the automatic imputation, since See Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1724 (arguing for broad protection of communication with a law firm's in-house counsel).
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740 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48 affiliated lawyers in the same firm already have access to the firm's files containing client confidences. 218 She also addresses the duty of loyalty. She notes that the Model Rules recognize the firm's right of self-defense-a right that would even permit the firm to disclose the outside client's own privileged communications in which the outside client obviously has an intense privacy interest. 219 As she writes, "the firm's duty of loyalty to the client does not prevent the firm from attempting to defend against client claims. This effort to defend is no more 'disloyal' when it involves inside rather than outside counsel." 220 Although there is merit to this part of her critique, it is not wholly satisfying. While the firm has a right "to defend [itself] against client claims," 221 she glosses over the difference between the firm's well-settled right to defend itself after the client terminates its services and the firm's more debatable entitlement to take defensive measures while it still represents the client. Intuitively, there would appear to be a distinction. To come to grips with that distinction, we must turn to the traditionalists' more fundamental argument based on the firm's fiduciary duty of loyalty to a current client.
The traditionalists' reliance on the attorney's fiduciary duty is misplaced. The traditionalists are correct in pointing out that when in a classic trust relationship, the trustee spends trust funds to hire an attorney to advise the trustee on the regular management of the corpus, the courts treat the cestui que trust (the beneficiary) as the real client and prevent the trustee from asserting the attorney-client privilege against the beneficiary. In 2011 in the Jicarilla Apache Nation case, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that generalization but noted that even today "[s]ome state courts have altogether rejected the notion that the attorneyclient privilege is subject to a fiduciary exception." 222 But even positing the existence of the exception, the traditionalists' analysis of the case law is incomplete. The generalization they rely on is merely the starting point in the analysis. As the Jicarilla Court noted, the origin of the fiduciary exception is traceable to conventional trust cases. 223 However, many of the modern cases are Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) lawsuits involving the administration of pension trust funds. 224 There is a wealth of ERISA case 218 Id. at 1748. 219 Id. at 1753. 220 Id. at 1748. 221 Id. 
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law analyzing the question of when the pension fund trustee may invoke the attorney-client privilege against the beneficiaries. 225 The cases apply the fiduciary exception to the trustee's communications with the trust counsel at the inception of the trust when there is a cooperative relationship between the trustee and the pensioner beneficiaries. 226 However, the cases recognize that at some point, it may become reasonably clear to the trustee that its interests have diverged from those of the beneficiary. 227 For example, the trustee might conclude that the beneficiary contemplates suing the trustee for mismanagement. Under the modern case law, when the trustee forms that belief, the trustee has a perfect right to hire counsel at the trustee's own expense to prepare for any possible litigation; and the attorney-client privilege will shield the communications between the trustee and its counsel from the beneficiaries. 228 Significantly, the privilege applies even though the trustee consults its counsel while the trustee-beneficiary relationship continues.
The parallel to the intra-firm privilege issue is evident. When in one way or another the outside client indicates that he or she may sue the firm for malpractice, the interests of the outside client and the firm have diverged. At that point, under the modern fiduciary exception case law the firm may seek counsel to prepare for the outside client's possible lawsuit against the firm. 229 The Jicarilla case stated that an important clue to the client's identity is the payor of the attorney's fee. 230 In Justice Alito's words, "[c]ourts look to the source of funds as a 'strong indicator of precisely who the real clients were' and a 'significant factor' in determining who ought to have access to the legal advice." 231 If the law firm instructs its in-house counsel to bill his or her time investigating the malpractice claim to the firm rather than the client, the instruction is important evidence that the firm is the real client. 232 In these circumstances, consistently with the ERISA case law, the firm may claim the privilege even against the person or company who was the firm's 225 See id. § 6.5.1.a(2), at 626 n.97 (citing a plethora of cases on this issue). 226 Id. 
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outside client at the time of the internal consultations. 233 The upshot is that the firm has legitimate, substantial interests warranting the protection of the attorney-client privilege, and none of the traditionalists' counter-arguments can withstand close scrutiny. Part III concluded that at least in some circumstances, a law firm should be able to assert the attorney-client privilege for communications between the firm's in-house counsel and the firm members representing an outside client about a potential malpractice claim even when the party later seeking discovery is the former outside client. 234 However, even assuming that an intra-firm privilege of some sort should exist, the question remains: What should be its extent or scope? 235 In what specific circumstances should the courts recognize the privilege? 236 First, this section argues which internal steps a firm should take to establish its identity as the client of its in-house counsel. 237 Second, it explains what the firm's external relations with the outside client should entail. 238 
IV. A CRITICAL EVALUATION
A. The Internal Steps the Firm Should Take to Establish Its Identity as the Client of Its In-House Counsel
In the 2013 Georgia and Massachusetts decisions, the state supreme courts underscored that the firm ought to implement procedures to ensure that both the firm's in-house counsel and the firm members representing the outside client understand that the client of the in-house counsel is the firm itself. 239 The firm must put in place appropriate structural arrangements. 240 Admittedly, both decisions are so recent that 233 E.g., id.
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See sufra Part III.
235
See Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1748 (suggesting that the scope of the in-firm privilege "vis-à-vis current clients should turn on the facts of the representation at issue"); Sadler, supra note 10, at 873 ("Rowe leaves unanswered the question as to the extent of the privilege when the communication directly related to the client who is seeking discovery.").
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See Sadler, supra note 10, at 867-68 (expounding on this question). Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1745-50 (discussing courts' treatment of this issue and proposing a structural approach).
it would be premature to predict the final form of the required procedures and structures. However, both courts expressed relatively strong preferences on four structural arrangements.
First, the firm should formally or informally designate the in-house counsel as the attorney whom firm members are to consult about ethical problems such as potential malpractice claims by current clients. 241 It would be ideal if the firm formalized the counsel's role by (1) selecting an attorney to serve in the role in a permanent, full-time basis with no outside practice; and (2) giving the attorney a title signaling his or her special role. 242 The next best arrangement would be to designate an attorney who serves as firm counsel on a part-time but ongoing basis. 243 However, a court might be willing to extend the privilege even when the attorney was designated on an ad hoc basis, 244 as the San Diego firm appointed the two associates in United States v. Rowe. 245 In Rowe, Rowe appointed the two associates to investigate the alleged mishandling of client funds even though they had never before functioned as counsel for the firm. 246 Nevertheless, Judge Kozinski characterized them as "effectively . . . in-house counsel." 247 However, as a practical matter a court is much more likely to find an affirmative understanding that the in-house attorney's client was the firm itself when the firm goes to the trouble to select experienced counsel and institutionalize a more formal arrangement. 248 The second procedure is negative in nature. Before the time when the firm formed the belief that the outside client might sue for malpractice, the attorney in question should not have participated in the client's representation; 249 and once the firm forms that belief, the attorney 241 St. Simons Waterfront, 746 S.E.2d at 104-05; RFF Family P'ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1080. 242 Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1733. 243 Id.
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Id. at 1296. 248 Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1733. In a provocative comment on the draft of this Article, Mr. Mokriski suggested that there might be a stronger argument for recognizing the privilege if the firm counsel was an employee rather than a partner. E-mail from Charles J. Mokriski, Prof'l Responsibility Proskauer Law Firm, to Edward J. Imwinkelried, Edward J. Barrett, Jr. Professor of Law, Univ. of Cal., Davis Sch. of Law (Sept. 19, 2013, 09:45 PST) (on file with author). It could be argued that as a mere employee, the counsel would have less of a stake in the outcome of the potential malpractice claim. Id. certainly ought not to participate in the representation. 250 The in-house attorney is undertaking to advise the firm-a representation distinct from the other attorneys' representation of the outside client. 251 The third and fourth procedural requirements flow from the prior two. The third is that the in-house counsel should open a new file separate from the file for the outside client. 252 After opening the new file, the in-house counsel should ensure that the documents for the two distinct representations are not commingled. 253 In the words of the Georgia Supreme Court, this records practice "helps distinguish the firm as the in-house counsel's client and the claim against the firm as a matter independent of the underlying representation." 254 The fourth and final requirement is a billing practice. Rather than billing the client for the in-house counsel's services, 255 the firm ought to assign a separate billing number; 256 and all the charges allocable to that number must be billed to the firm itself. 257 As previously stated, in its 2011 Jicarilla Apache Nation decision, the U.S. Supreme Court observed that the identity of the payor is "a 'strong indicator of precisely who the real clients'" are. 258 If the firm adopts these four internal practices and both the in-house counsel and the attorneys representing the outside client are aware of these practices, there is a strong case that the firm itself has established its status as the in-house counsel's client. To be sure, subsidiary issues will arise as the courts refine the understanding of these practices and shape their final form. 259 However, the major remaining policy question 250 Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1732. As a corollary to the in-house counsel's noninvolvement in the representation of the outside client, the counsel should not share in any fee paid by the outside client. Id. at 1745. Gillers, supra note 32, at 109; Habte, supra note 7, at 1762. 253 St. Simons Waterfront., 746 S.E.2d at 105. 254 Id. Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1749; Gillers, supra note 32, at 111.
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becomes whether, in its external relations with the outside client, the firm has conducted itself in a manner that justifies requiring the outside client to respect the firm's internal confidential consultations. Part IV.B turns to that question. 260 
B. The Firm's External Relations with the Outside Client
Just as there is general consensus on the internal procedures that the firm should follow to claim an intra-firm privilege, there is agreement on some of the things the firm must do to fulfill its professional responsibilities to the outside client. To begin, if the client does not realize that an event has occurred that may give rise to a malpractice claim against the firm, the firm must notify the client of the existence of the potential claim. 261 Of course, when the firm makes this disclosure to the outside client, the firm should also explain that the client has the right to consult independent counsel about the validity and pursuit of the potential claim. 262 However, there the consensus ends. At this point, the troublesome question arises: Before consulting in-house counsel about the claims (and becoming entitled to invoke the attorney-client privilege), must the firm seek and obtain the outside client's consent to the firm's internal consultations about a defense against the potential claim? That question is reducible to two sub-issues. 
262
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 20 (3) ("A lawyer . . . must explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.").
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See infra Part IV.B.1 (posing the question: "If it becomes clear that the outside client may sue the firm for malpractice, does that development ipso facto create an actual conflict of interest requiring the firm to obtain the client's consent before conducting internal consultations between the attorneys representing the client and the firm's in-house counsel about the malpractice issue?"); infra Part IV.B.2 (asking: "If an actual conflict of interest arises but the firm fails to obtain the outside client's consent to internal consultations about the potential malpractice claim, does the failure preclude the firm from later claiming an attorney-client privilege covering the consultations?").
Representing the Client and the Firm's In-House Counsel About the Malpractice Issue?
One of the recurring themes in the cases advocating the traditional, majority view is that when the outside client indicates that it contemplates suing the firm for malpractice, an actual conflict of interest arises between the client and the firm. The Koen decision is a case in point. Early in the opinion, the court pointed to the conflict of interest rules set out in Pennsylvania Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7, modeled after the A.B.A. Model Rule. 264 The court found that when the firm members representing the Koen company sought legal advice from "another lawyer inside the firm" about the company's potential claim, a conflict arose that "vitiated" any privilege claim by the firm. 265 Likewise, the earlier Sunrise court relied on Rule 1.7 as an essential premise of its decision. 266 Given the central role of the conflict rules under the majority view, it is important to examine the precise terms of Model Rule 1.7. Rule 1.7(a) identifies the situations in which a disqualifying conflict exists. The current version of Rule 1.7(a) provides: (1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or (2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer. 267 The official Comments to Rule 1.7 elaborate on the meaning of the provisions. For instance, Comment 6 explains that (a) (1) Even where there is no direct adverseness, a conflict of interest exists if there is a significant risk that a lawyer's ability to consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client will be materially limited as a result of the lawyer's other responsibilities or interests. For example, a lawyer asked to represent several individuals seeking to form a joint venture is likely to be materially limited in the lawyer's ability to recommend or advocate all possible positions that each might take because of the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the others. The conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client. The mere possibility of subsequent harm does not itself require disclosure and consent. The critical questions are the likelihood that a difference in interests will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client. 269 Commenting on the definition of conflict of interest in the analogous Sixth Amendment context, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stated that the key to finding a conflict is identifying a plausible alternative strategy that the competing interest might prompt the attorney not to pursue. 270 How do the conflict rules apply to the scenario in which the outside client is threatening to sue or suing the firm for malpractice? If the outside client has already filed a malpractice lawsuit against the firm, there certainly is an actual conflict of interest between the outside client and the firm under Rule 1.7(a)(1); they are the named, opposing plaintiff and defendant in the same lawsuit.
However, when the outside client has not yet filed suit but has threatened to sue, Rule 1.7(a)(2) does not dictate the conclusion that there is already a conflict. Assume, for example, that the outside client 268 Id. at R. 1.7 cmt. 6. 269 Id. at R. 1.7 cmt. 8. 748 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48 expresses its dissatisfaction with the firm's services very late in the representation-after pretrial discovery has closed, after trial has been scheduled, after the judge has entered his or her pretrial order including the parties' final stipulations, after the two sides have submitted their formal witnesses lists, and after the opposition has indicated that it is no longer interested in pursuing settlement negotiations. 271 The outside client's grumbling undeniably creates a tension between the client and the firm, but in the words of Comment 8 "the critical question[]" is whether the firm's concern about the malpractice claim could affect its "professional judgment in considering alternative[]" strategies. 272 At this late point in the litigation, the firm may have no alternatives; as a practical matter the firm is locked into a theory of the case and a set of witnesses with which to establish that theory. No matter how explicit the outside client's threat to later sue for malpractice if the firm loses, unless it withdraws the firm's only option is to pursue its chosen strategy-to prevail on that theory of the case and hopefully moot the malpractice issue.
The analysis becomes more complex, though, if the outside client raises the possibility of a malpractice action earlier in the litigation when the firm members representing the client still have a choice among alternative strategies. Even then, though, there is not necessarily a disqualifying conflict. A conflict arises only when there is a plausible "link[]" between the firm's alleged neglect and the firm's choice among the alternative strategies for representing the outside client. 273 Suppose, for example, that the outside client contends that the firm was negligent in preparing to depose an opposing expert. The client asserts that the firm attorneys deposing the expert were woefully unprepared and wasted the time and money attributable to the deposition. However, the opposing litigant later announces that it does not intend to call that expert at trial. The outside client may have a malpractice claim against the firm to recover the fees paid in connection with the deposition, and the client's threat to press the claim unquestionably introduces an element of tension in the relationship between the client and the firm. Yet, since that expert will not appear at trial, it is hard to see how that tension can influence the firm's selection of strategies or tactics for representing the client. Tension or not, without more there does not appear to be a disqualifying conflict under Model Rule 1.7(a)(2). 
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However, varying the facts again, now suppose that the opposing litigant does not withdraw the expert. Rather, as trial approaches, it becomes evident that the opposition views that expert as its star witness. Moreover, assume that on the eve of trial, the firm realizes that there are several different ways of attempting to undermine the expert's testimony. 274 One of the possible modes of attack is the type of impeachment that the firm used unsuccessfully at the expert's pretrial deposition. Again, the outside client has indicated that it believes that the firm attorneys representing the client were inadequately prepared to develop that impeachment at the deposition. Given the threat of the malpractice claim, the firm might be tempted to resort to that impeachment at trial to show that even if the attack were fully developed, it would not undercut the expert; if the record demonstrated that, the malpractice claim would lack merit. At trial, the firm attorneys could combine that mode of impeachment with other attacks on the expert's testimony, which they believe could succeed. In any event, in this variation of the scenario, the spectre of the malpractice lawsuit might influence the firm's choice among alternative strategies and could, thus, create a genuine conflict of interest. At the very least, that possibility could impact the attorney's advice concerning the advisability of settlement. the threatened malpractice claim. 282 Given the asserted requirement for consent, several practical and legal issues arise.
After concluding that the firm might have committed malpractice, why might the outside client want the firm to continue to represent the client? The lawyer-client relationship is simply one type of human relationship. Persons and companies standing in relationships often decide to continue the relationship after encountering "bumps in the road." Spouses do so, employers and employees do so, doctors and patients do so, and businesses in contractual relationships do so. Even after a minor breach by the other contracting party, a business might conduct a cost/benefit analysis and conclude that the long-term economic value of maintaining the contract far exceeds the paltry amount of damage caused by the minor breach.
In this context, it is easy to conceive of realistic circumstances in which the outside client would desperately want the firm to continue the representation. It could be a foolish, knee-jerk reaction for the outside client to terminate the firm as soon as the client concludes that the firm has committed an act of malpractice. Assume that the law firm has more expertise at this type of transaction or litigation than any other firm, the firm has spent months or years collecting the facts and conducting the relevant legal research, and the hour is late-the trial is scheduled to begin soon, or the other party to the business transaction has signaled that it wants to conclude the negotiations shortly. All those factors could pressure the outside client to favor the continuation of the representation by the firm.
Even if the client consents, why would the firm opt to continue the representation of the client rather than seeking to withdraw and beginning preparations to defend any malpractice action? At first blush, one might think that the path of caution for the firm would be to attempt to withdraw "at the first hint of a problem" 283 and then commence in earnest preparations for any subsequent malpractice action. However, by doing so, the firm would lose its opportunity to mitigate any harm to the client 284 and thereby minimize the amount of damages it might have to pay as a result of any subsequent malpractice judgment. In many, if not most, cases, the firm can render the malpractice issue moot by achieving a favorable outcome for the client in the transaction or litigation. Especially if the firm has special expertise in the area and has already devoted months or years to assembling the relevant facts, the 282 See RFF Family P'ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1072 (discussing the importance of such communication). 283 Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1747. firm might quite sensibly conclude that it is in a much better position than any other law firm to achieve a successful result for the client.
The interplay of the practical consideration described in the preceding three paragraphs ultimately leads to the decisive legal issue: If (1) the outside client does not terminate the firm but withholds consent to the firm's in-house consultations; and (2) the firm does not withdraw and decides to conduct the in-house consultations, does the client's lack of consent preclude the attorney-client privilege from attaching to the consultations? In this variation of the situation, will the firm altogether forego any privilege if the firm decides to conduct the consultations despite the client's refusal to consent? 285 There is a strong case that in most cases, the answer to that question should be no.
Assume arguendo that the firm's conduct constitutes an ethical violation of Model Rule 1.7(b). As the Georgia Supreme Court noted in its 2013 decision, the question of the applicability of the attorney-client privilege is governed by evidence laws, not legal ethics. 286 In Georgia, as in many states, the history and text of the state ethical rules make it clear that the ethical rules "'are not intended to govern or affect judicial application of . . . the attorney-client . . . privilege.'" 287 In passing, in their opinions, both the Ninth Circuit in Rowe and the Georgia court briefly mentioned the evidentiary doctrine that arguably controls here-the crime/fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. 288 Unfortunately, to date neither the cases applying the traditional view nor those espousing the minority view have undertaken a thorough analysis of the applicability of that exception to this fact situation. As the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized, most recently in United States v. Zolin, although the law hopes to encourage legitimate consultations between clients and attorneys, the law does not want to facilitate the commission of crimes and frauds. 289 Consequently, the privilege does not attach when a client consults an attorney for the primary purpose of obtaining advice to facilitate the commission of an ongoing or future crime or fraud. A proponent of the traditional, 285 majority view denying intra-firm privilege might contend that when the firm conducts in-house consultations without the required consent of the outside client, the crime/fraud exception applies, precluding the recognition of an attorney-client privilege. In many situations, though, that contention will fail.
To begin, most jurisdictions hold that, standing alone, a violation of the legal ethics rules does not constitute a crime or fraud. It is true that jurisdictions vary in their views of the breadth of the exception. 290 For example, while some states apply the exception only to fraud upon the court, most states extend the exception to any tort of fraud. 291 However, only a distinct minority of states have expanded the scope of the exception to reach violations of the rules of legal ethics. 292 Unless the facts underlying the legal ethical violation also constituted either a crime or a tort of fraud, the crime/fraud exception cannot be invoked to defeat a prima facie case for applying the privilege.
To be sure, there are situations in which the facts establishing the legal ethical violation will also make out a case for fraud. It is one thing for the firm to engage in internal consultations despite the outside client's refusal to consent if the firm informs the client that it nevertheless intends to conduct the consultations. It is quite another matter-and a fact situation which would arguably trigger the crime/fraud exception-when the firm members representing the outside client seek the in-house counsel's advice as to how to conceal the consultations from the client. As Professor Chambliss interprets the facts in Bank Brussels, there the firm attorneys representing the client "sought . . . [the] advice" of the head of the firm's Clients and Ethics Committee "primarily in order to conceal the conflict." 293 She correctly concludes that this type of misconduct is tortious and fraudulent. 294 However, facts as extreme as those in Bank Brussels are presumably atypical. In a run-of-the-mill case, the firm seeking to invoke the privilege can forthrightly inform the outside client that even without the client's blessing, the firm members representing the client intend to consult with in-house counsel about defensive measures in anticipation of a malpractice claim. 295 Of course, at that juncture the client is free to 290 See 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 9, § 6.13.2.d(1), at 1170-75 (exploring splits in authority).
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See id. § 6.13.2.d(1), at 1172 (stating that the majority of jurisdictions construe fraud "broadly"). 292 Id. § 6.13.2.d(2), at 1175. 293 Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1751. 294 Id. terminate the firm even if the client did not fire the firm earlier when the client initially discovered the possible malpractice claim. Moreover, as the Georgia Supreme Court noted, it is conceivable that, although the privilege would apply to the consultations, the firm would be guilty of an ethical violation. 296 However, there is no logical necessity for legal ethics rules to dictate evidentiary doctrine.
In its opinion, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court deemed it significant that in the lengthy list of thirteen different judicial remedies for a lawyer's breach of ethical duties in the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, there is no mention of denial or forfeiture of privilege as a sanction. 297 
V. CONCLUSION
There is unanimity that the members of a law firm owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty to the firm's outside clients. However, "fiduciary" is not a talisman that makes the firm's legitimate interests and rights vanish. The firm has substantial reputational and financial interests that justify the protection of the attorney-client privilege when the firm has made it clear that it is the client of an in-house firm counsel and the firm has been candid in its dealings with the outside client. No human relationship is perfect. It is to be expected that even after the persons or entities voluntarily form a trusting, cooperative attorney-client relationship, the client will sometimes conclude that the attorney has breached its duties to the client-even when the client decides against immediately terminating the relationship.
To be sure, when the relationship continues, the outside client has a right to expect competent legal service during the balance of the representation. Moreover, the client does not waive the potential malpractice claim by retaining the firm. For that matter, while the relationship survives, the outside client is obviously free to hire a second law firm to begin developing the malpractice case against the firmwhich is precisely what SSW did in the Georgia case. 298 No one would deny that SSW enjoyed an attorney-client privilege protecting its consultations with the second firm and that SSW could have asserted 296 Id. at 106 n.4 ("We emphasize that this opinion is not intended to resolve the ethical quandary and instead addresses only the evidentiary questions of privilege . . . ."). St. Simons Waterfront, 746 S.E.2d at 102 ("SSW retained another law firm . . . to pursue potential action against Hunter Maclean; new counsel requested . . . that Hunter Maclean continue to handle the ongoing closings, which Hunter Maclean did . . . .").
